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Abstract 
  
 
This article analyses the impact of interorganizational mobility on academic performance. 
We develop a theoretical framework based on the job-matching approach adapted for 
researchers. The empirical analysis studies the careers of a sample of 171 UK academics, 
spanning 1957 to 2005. We find no evidence that mobility per se increases academic 
performance. Only mobility to ‘better’ departments has a positive weakly significant impact, 
while downward mobility reduces researchers’ productivity. Job mobility is always 
associated with a short-term decrease in performance. 
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1. Introduction 
The UK university system has undergone a major restructuring since the 1980s. Starting from 
the introduction of the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) in 1986, policy action has 
driven the system towards higher levels of concentration of research resources in a small 
number of research intensive universities (DES, 1991; HEFC, 1997; DfES, 2003; BIS, 2009). 
Concentration and selectivity policies have created a market for academics, and increased 
mobility of permanent full-time scientists (DfES, 2003). Interorganizational mobility of 
researchers has been seen as a positive by-product of policy action, to be directly supported 
(HEFC, 1997).
1
 Data from the Higher Education Statistical Agency (HESA) spanning the 
period 1994-95 to 2005-06 (the last year included in our database of UK scientists) show 
almost a doubling in the share of full time academics changing employment; with some 2,600 
academics changing jobs in 1994-1995 and about 5,100 in 2005-06.  
Interorganizational mobility can give rise to both social and individual productivity returns. 
Researcher mobility could be a mechanism of knowledge diffusion and generate positive 
spill-overs between firms, sectors, institutions and countries. By increasing the diffusion of 
ideas, researcher mobility may be positive for the research system as a whole. A few papers 
analyze these socially relevant benefits by focusing on the spill-over effect of mobility 
among firms (Pakes and Nitzan, 1983; Cooper, 2001; Møen, 2005), sectors (Zucker et al., 
1998; Crespi et al., 2007; Azoulay et al., 2011) and academic institutions and countries 
(Moser et al., 2011; Borjas and Doran, 2012). More systematic investigation is still required 
to properly understand the social returns of academic mobility. 
                                                 
1
 See Universities UK (2009) for an analysis of increased concentration of resources in the UK system in the 
period 1994-2007.  
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Even less is known for the case of individual productivity returns to academic mobility. We 
know little about the benefits (or costs) associated to the decision of a scientist to move to a 
new job in a different university. This paper tries to fill this gap by assessing whether and 
how mobility to another university affects researchers’ publication productivity. We thus ask 
from the perspective of individual scientific performance, whether a scientist should stay or 
should go to a new university? A few papers in the sociology of science (see e.g. Allison and 
Long, 1990, and much earlier Hargens and Farr, 1973) study this topic and find some weak 
evidence of a negative impact of immobility and some suggestion that job mobility is a 
characteristic of productive researchers (van Heeringen and Dijkwel, 1987; Allison and 
Long, 1987). Some attention has also been devoted to the relationship between individual 
research productivity and international scientific mobility both at post-doctoral level 
(Cañibano et al., 2008; Zubieta, 2009; Horta et al. 2010; Franzoni et al., 2012 ) and in general 
(Stephan and Levin, 2001; Hunter et al., 2009; Stephan, 2012; Franzoni et al., 2012). 
However, due to unavailability of data and difficulties related to controlling for endogeneity 
bias, these studies offer only limited insights into the relationship between mobility and 
productivity. 
We develop a theoretical framework to predict the impact of job mobility on research 
productivity, based on a job-matching approach to academic labor mobility that emphasizes 
research and reputation factors. The idea that productivity is driven by the availability of 
capital equipment (and human capital) for research and peer effects leads us to expect 
medium-term positive effects on productivity only for job changes that imply a move to a 
higher quality/reputation institution. In our framework, a job change is associated always 
with a short-term reduction in productivity due to mobility and adjustment costs. 
  
4 
We test the predictions of the theoretical framework with information about the entire careers 
of a sample of mobile and non-mobile researchers. We estimate a series of econometric 
specifications of our model in a dynamic set up, to assess the impact of job changes on post-
mobility output. To address the problem of endogeneity arising from reverse causality we 
estimate an IV model using distance from place of birth (time invariant) and performance 
mismatch (time variant) as instruments. The empirical analysis is based on a unique database 
that includes detailed information on the employment patterns and publishing activities of a 
sample of UK academic researchers in science and engineering, from the year of their first 
professional appointment, for the period 1957 to 2005. The availability of reliable institution-
level information on publications and citations needed to build an original time varying 
research-ranking indicator, limited the econometric analysis to the 23 years period 1982-
2005. Our sampling strategy includes a focus only on research active academics occupying 
‘tenured type’ positions, that is, we do not include mobility due to non-renewal of contract. 
Thus, a job change is the result of the researchers’ decision.  
We find no evidence that mobility per se boosts the scientific productivity of researchers; 
what matters is where an academic moves to. Mobility to lower ranked universities is 
accompanied by a decrease in both number and impact of publications, while upward 
mobility is associated with a positive, weakly significant increase in productivity, but no 
quality effect. In both cases we find strong evidence of short-term negative effects.  
 
2. What do we know about researchers’ productivity and interorganizational 
mobility? 
In their study of academic stars, Zucker et al. (2002) examine the case of mobile scientists, 
emphasizing the role of productivity for explaining mobility; this seminal study has been 
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followed by many others. Instead, there are only few systematic studies that try to assess the 
other side of the relationship - whether mobility has a positive or negative impact on 
scientific productivity (amongst them Allison and Long, 1990), and there is no evidence that 
considers the causal effect between mobility and researcher productivity. 
This paper tries to help to fill this gap. Starting from the traditional analytical model of 
scientific productivity (Cole, 1979; Levin and Stephan, 1991), we study scientific 
productivity (sp) as a function of individual characteristics, environmental specificities and 
mobility events:  
sp = f (M, p,h)
    
(1) 
where M is the mobility event, p is individual personal and academic characteristics and h is 
institution, field, country and time-specific environmental characteristics affecting scientific 
productivity. 
Job mobility may have a positive impact on research productivity only if the researcher finds 
better conditions for pursuing her research endeavor; for example, if she moves to a new job 
in order to increase her research performance. However, there are other traditional reasons 
for mobility (salary, family demands, etc.) that are unrelated to research performance. To 
fully understand the impact of mobility on research productivity we need first to understand 
what drives researchers’ mobility, and then to model the impact of mobility on performance 
controlling for those factors that might have a confounding effect. Below, we briefly review 
the main tenets in the literature on the drivers of mobility, and discuss the characteristics that 
distinguish the academic labor market (Section 2.1); in Section 2.2 we propose a model for 
academic mobility and its impact on researcher performance. In the empirical analysis we 
will take into account the mobility model when we estimate the productivity equation (1). 
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2.1. The academic labor market: Distinctive characteristics  
Traditional labor market factors  
The academic labor market is driven by traditional labor market factors and a set of 
academia-specific factors related to research and reputation. The most important labor market 
factors are: (1) wage related – the difference between current compensation and the new 
wage offer; (2) career related – promotion to associate or full professor usually associated 
with access to more resources for research and the possibility of hiring and directing doctoral 
and post-doctoral fellows; (3) opportunity related – non-permanent academic jobs are 
becoming more common in all countries and are associated with termination and non-renewal 
of contracts resulting in involuntary mobility; (4) market related – the fluidity of the job 
market differs across countries and disciplinary fields and the density of the market varies 
depending on the time period;
2
 (5) mobility cost related – the costs associated with mobility 
are not fixed and depend on mobility experience;
3
 (6) family related – partners moving, 
ageing parents, and children’s education are common reasons for involuntary mobility and 
also reduction in the propensity to move, and introduce a gender and age bias.       
Academic distinctive mobility factors  
The academic labor market is characterized by some distinctly academic factors, which are 
the focus of this paper. In the academic labor market research and “reputational” factors 
could be as, or even more, important than salary in the decision to accept or reject an offer 
                                                 
2
 See the discussion of transfer markets for top scientists as a feature of the UK Research Assessment Exercise 
(Elton, 2000). 
3
 First-time mobility is the most costly (leaving home effect); multiple job changes are associated with learning 
from experience which decreases mobility costs (e.g., foreigners or nationals with foreign PhDs will have lower 
mobility costs).  
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(Levin and Stephan 1991). For academics, research (time and support) is the most important 
aspect of their job and yield the greatest job satisfaction while also being a work activity that 
produces outputs. The time spent doing research is perceived by academics as partly 
consumption time, resulting in a willingness to forego the higher wages available in industry 
jobs which do not allow independent research. Hence, all else being equal, academics are 
willing to earn less in order to be able to focus on their chosen research (Stern, 2004; 
Sauermann and Roach, 2013). Another important argument in the utility function of a 
researcher is reputation, which is affected in part by institutional reputation (to simplify we 
do not distinguish between department and university). A researcher values employment in a 
highly prestigious institution because of its direct benefits, such as more research time, higher 
financial endowments, etc., but also because of the positive externalities attached to these 
positions which can add to individual reputation. These aspects are important in the market 
for scientists where individual quality assessments are not straightforward, especially in early 
stage research careers, and publications are not perfect carriers of information. All else being 
equal, an academic will move to a higher-ranked institution (expecting the benefits to 
outweigh the mobility costs), since research and reputation enter positively in her utility 
function. In addition, institutional reputation may increase the probability of receiving future 
research funding; in the context of funding agencies’ selection, there are more excellent 
proposals than available budget, and institutional reputation can matter for the final selection 
decision.  
In addition, especially in new and fast changing disciplines, mobility is driven by the 
prospect of accessing tacit knowledge and new equipment. In the early phases of 
development of a new discipline, knowledge is located in a small number of laboratories 
responsible for the original discoveries. Publications allow this knowledge to percolate 
through the university system, but due especially to the invention of new equipment (see e.g. 
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the case of the production of the onco-mouse, Murray, 2010), some knowledge is ‘sticky’ to a 
particular laboratory and can be passed on only via training in and use of the equipment. 
Researchers are willing to bear the costs of a move to these centers in order to acquire the 
tacit knowledge held there. Acquisition of tacit knowledge can be achieved through short 
stays (such as sabbatical leave) or job changes.  
Finally, academic mobility is strongly affected by relative opportunity advantage. In a market 
with clear reputation/quality ranking, researchers working in high-ranked institutions have 
much lower probabilities of moving, all else being equal.   
 
2.2 Modeling the relationship between mobility and researcher’s scientific productivity 
The mobility model  
The relationship between mobility and researchers’ scientific productivity is bidirectional. To 
model the impact of mobility on research productivity we need to first model the reasons of 
academic mobility (M). The probability of a job change (M) depends on the probability of 
receiving a job offer f(.) and the probability of accepting that job offer g(.). Let us define: 
M = f (×)´g(.) where  f (×)= f s,e, p( )
 
and 
  g(×)= g w,b,c,r( ) (2) 
  
The probability of receiving an offer f(.) is likely to depend on factors such as search effort 
(s), and environmental (e) and individual (p) labor characteristics. The probability of 
accepting an offer g(.) is likely to depend on the level of the wage offer (w) relative to the 
individual’s current compensation (b), and other mobility costs (c). We modify the basic 
model to include the academic labor market distinctive factor (r) that takes account of the 
research and reputation related effects discussed in the previous section.  
While the probability of receiving a job offer f(.) depends on traditional labor market factors 
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contextualized to the academic market, the probability of accepting an offer g(.) takes a 
different form in the academic market. In academia, academic salaries tend to vary within a 
well-defined national range, based on experience, with some limited flexibility at the top 
depending on the country considered. In the US professorial salaries can vary significantly, 
however, in most other countries, public employee contracts or tradition give little room for 
individual salary increases. In the academic labor market, this leads to a reduced effect of 
salary on the probability of moving. In Europe, the wage offer (w) relative to the individual’s 
current compensation (b) plays a small role in explaining mobility. Thus, we can write the 
probability of accepting a job offer as follows: 
g(×) = g p,c,r( )
 
(3) 
where the probability of accepting a new academic position depends on personal 
characteristics (p), mobility costs (c) and the research and reputation effect (r). 
Among personal characteristics (p), a key determinant of the probability of accepting a job 
offer is the academic position of the researcher (pt). Non-tenured researchers are more likely 
than tenured university staff to accept an offer since they have a non-zero probability of non-
renewal of contract (all non-tenured positions are based on ‘soft’ money that is time limited). 
Individual personal characteristics (pf), such as age and gender, can affect the probability of 
accepting an offer due to family-related considerations which can increase or decrease 
mobility costs.  
The probability of accepting an offer g(.) depends negatively on mobility costs (c). Mobility 
costs include the direct personal costs of moving to another city or country, and the skills-
adjustment costs - particularly important in high skilled jobs. If the researcher’s skills are 
university specific (i.e. not all the routines of the academic teaching and research work are 
transferable to the work in the new university), it will be necessary to learn new practices, 
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protocols and routines, and adjust to different management and administration procedures. 
This may result in a period of adjustment with lower expected efficiency. Even when these 
skill adjustments are minor, they can be considered sunk costs and may deter some 
researchers from moving.
4
 This applies especially to mature academic researchers who have 
invested a lot of time in accumulating the skills and reputation needed to succeed in a specific 
university environment. Due to learning effects, both the direct and skills adjustment mobility 
costs are decreasing in the number of times a researcher has moved. Individual personal 
characteristics (pf) affect the assessment of mobility and adjustment costs. 
Scientific performance (sp) is a specific personal characteristics that directly affects the 
probability of receiving f(.) and indirectly affects acceptance of a job offer g(.). Researchers 
with a good publications track record will have better career and retention package prospects 
affecting g(.). However, more productive academic researchers will have a higher chance of 
receiving a job offer from another university since research performance usually is 
considered the most important criterion for selection (conditio sine qua non). Scientific 
productivity can be seen as signaling a high quality researcher, increasing the probability of 
receiving an offer f(.) and decreasing the probability of accepting an offer g(.).  
Finally, according to the discussion in the previous section, the probability of accepting an 
offer g(.) depends also on the researcher’s expectation of higher research performance (r) 
achievable in the new job at a higher ranked institution. We can therefore write the mobility 
model as: 
M = f (×)´g(.)= f (sp, s,e)´g sp, pt,c(pf ),r( )
  
(4) 
 
                                                 
4
 A related interpretation of mobility costs can be found in Shaw (1987). 
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Productivity model 
We now turn to the impact of mobility on scientific productivity (sp). The researcher’s post-
mobility productivity is affected by the reasons for the move. For example, a researcher 
moves to a new job if the value Vt+1 of her utility function is higher than the value Vt before 
the move at time t. This may be due to the traditional job search related factors discussed 
above, and/or because of an expected better research and reputation environment (r). Only if 
the job change is driven by research and reputation related motives can we expect a positive 
impact on performance. Hence, not all types of job mobility are associated with increased 
research productivity.  
Accordingly, scientific productivity is affected by mobility events determined by research 
and reputation motives M (r), individual academic characteristics such as career rank pt, 
individual personal characteristics such as gender pf, and institution, field, country and time 
specific environmental characteristics h (e.g. there is a greater tendency to publish and cite 
more in medicine than in economics).  We can therefore write the productivity model as: 
sp = f (M(r), pt, pf ,h)
    
(5) 
 
Mobility is expected to be associated with an increase in productivity due to its effects on 
matching and networking. In terms of matching, the model predicts that researchers with high 
potential productivity unexploited in a lower quality department, can expect to increase their 
performance in a higher ranked institution because there will be more capital available for 
research, crucial in the natural and biomedical sciences where laboratory costs (equipment 
and human capital) are extremely high (Stephan, 2012)..
5
 In terms of networking, interpreted 
                                                 
5
 Positive social effects results also from the mobility to lower ranked institutions which frees up space in higher 
ranked institutions for hiring higher performing scientists.  
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as better human (more diverse learning opportunities) and social (better network connections) 
capital, the model predicts that a move to a better department means a move to a higher 
quality research group with positive peer and network effects which increase the researcher’s 
performance. Research group composition and local peer effects have been identified as 
important predictors of individual performance (Weinberg, 2007), and researchers are more 
productive if they collocate with productive scientists. However, Kim et al. (2009) find that 
peer-effects have diminished since the 1990s, perhaps due to improved communication 
technology (see also Ding et al., 2010). Working in a department with high quality peers 
enhances performance not only through direct interactions but also through privileged access 
to their social networks. In addition, mobile researchers continue to benefit from their 
existing networks, which they bring to the new environment (Azoulay et al., 2010; 
Waldinger, 2012) thereby creating new extended networks with the potential for new 
knowledge combinations. It is very difficult to disentangle the matching effect from the 
social/human capital model since, in high reputation departments, both are present (funding 
for good labs, and high ranked peers who enable access to better quality social networks and 
more learning). Also, reputable researchers tend to concentrate in high ranked departments 
(Oyer, 2007) because they are the source of the ranking and, due to competitive allocation of 
resources, these departments receive the most funding. 
Within this framework, we hypothesize that only a move to a higher quality/reputation 
institution will be associated with a medium-term increase in research productivity; after an 
initial period when adjustment costs may constrain researchers’ productivity, we can expect 
increased research performance. On the basis that scientific production is strongly affected by 
the phenomena of cumulativeness and self-reinforcement (Dasgupta and David, 1994), we 
would expect that improved medium-term productivity will be persistent and, thus, will affect 
the long-term performance of researchers.  
  
13 
H1: Academic job mobility to a higher ranked institution is associated with an increase in 
research productivity. 
Conversely, mobility to an institution of the same or lower quality/reputation will be 
associated with short-term lower productivity due to adjustment costs. These will be only 
slightly mitigated and at best stabilize at pre-mobility levels (for same rank changes) or at 
lower performance levels in the medium to long term, due to research resource constraints 
(such as financial and human support resources) and reputation, assuming the move involves 
a similar work profile (e.g. similar teaching and administration loads).
6
   
H2: Academic job mobility to a lower ranked institution is associated with a decrease in 
scientific productivity. 
In the basic job search model, the difference Vt+1 - Vt should be higher than the mobility costs 
(c) for a job change to happen. Mobility costs are assumed to be immediate. However, 
mobility can be associated with significant deferred adjustment costs which can have a 
negative impact on post-mobility productivity because the researcher will have less time to 
spend on research activities due to the need to devote time to learning to perform tasks that 
were accomplished more efficiently in the previous job because of the scientist’s familiarity 
with its practices, protocols and routines (van Heeringen and Dijkwel, 1987; Shaw, 1987; 
Groysberg, 2008). Following a job change in laboratory-based work, the researcher can show 
                                                 
6
 Relaxing this assumption would mean considering either the case where the work load diminishes (a move to a 
department with lower reputation, but which involves less teaching because the researcher is considered a star) 
resulting in a positive impact on scientific productivity, or the case of a move to a more teaching-intensive 
institution (e.g. because it was impossible to get tenure/permanent contract in a top department), resulting in a 
decrease in productivity. A typical example of the first situation is a move to a lower ranked institution 
associated with promotion to full professor.  
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decreased productivity associated with the setting up of a new laboratory. The extent of this 
reduced performance will depend on the relevance of the adjustment costs, which, in turn, 
will depend on the learning required to adjust to the new job.  
H3: Academic job mobility is associated with a short-term decrease in research productivity 
due to adjustment costs 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
The empirical study is based on a sample of 171 research active academics working at 53 
different UK universities in 2005, in four scientific fields: chemistry, physics, computer 
science, and mechanical, aeronautical and manufacturing engineering.
7
 CVs were collected 
for all 171 researchers and information on academic performance was complemented with 
information from the Web of Science (WoS). We coded career information taken from CVs 
to construct comprehensive profiles for all 171 researchers, spanning their careers from PhD 
award to 2005, resulting in a panel for the period 1957 to 2005. Researchers’ CVs include 
unique information on career paths and the timing and nature of job transitions allowing us to 
identify the exact year of mobility. Using data collected from CVs we were also able to 
improve the accuracy of the publication data collected from WoS since we were able to avoid 
mismatches arising from similar names and changes in researchers’ institutional affiliations. 
                                                 
7
 The sample is based on a 2004 survey of academic researchers that were awarded a grant from the Engineering 
and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) at least once between 1999 and 2003, and who therefore can 
be considered research active. In a second survey round the sub-sample of 666 academics in the four scientific 
fields of interest were asked to submit CVs and 171 replies were obtained. See Crespi et al. (2011) for a detailed 
description of the database and a response rate analysis. 
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In our analysis we focus on inter-institutional ‘real’ labor mobility (Crespi et al., 2007), 
which implies a change in job position from one institution to another. Changes in job 
position within the same institution are not considered (e.g. a move to a different department 
in the same university). We also consider only changes that occur after the first ‘tenure-track’ 
or permanent position in academia or first full time position in industry, after award of the 
PhD degree.
8
 We do not include in this analysis postdoctoral mobility as postdoctoral 
mobility and job mobility show very different patterns (Zubieta, 2009), due to the temporary 
characteristic of postdoc and other short term research fellowships.  
In the UK, the minimum tenure-track positions in academia are lecturer, followed by ‘senior 
lecturer’, ‘reader’ and ‘professor’. Since the early 1990s, parallel to the traditional teaching 
and research academic career ladder there has been the development of a research only career 
within the university system financed by soft money with a large increase in short-term 
contracts at research fellow level. Most often, there are three type of research position: 
research fellow, senior research fellow and research professor. There is quite some variety in 
the way in which this research positions are regulated by the different universities and some 
of them can be more short term than others. We considered research fellow positions a 
tenure-track equivalent to lecturer only if they continue for at least five years, indicating a 
long-term relationship with the university, equivalent to a probation period. Academics in the 
UK are usually hired on permanent contracts, which, in the case of lecturer appointments or 
research fellowships, are subject to a three-year probation period. Thus, mobility in our 
                                                 
8
 In only 12 cases was the first position taken up before completion of the PhD. This can be due to appointment 
to academic staff before degree completion or to an initial career in industry followed by a later return to 
academia. 
  
16 
sample is likely to be voluntary, that is, where researchers leave a permanent position for 
reasons other than termination of contract. 
The academic market in the UK differs from that in the rest of Europe. It is characterized by 
its internationality - it attracts academics from across the world, and by the competition 
amongst its universities for the most promising scholars (BIS, 2011; Ziman, 1991). Further, 
the three-step promotion system and race for positions at the most prestigious institutions 
(Hoare, 1994) make the UK system more competitive than other academic systems in 
Europe. There is no obligation to move after PhD completion; however, mobility barriers are 
very low and mobility is usually rewarded, making the UK academic labor market very fluid. 
Our sample consists of researchers aged 29 to 77, who were active in 2005. The mean age of 
the sample is 49 in 2005. The first researcher joins our sample in 1957 and the last in 2003. 
Accordingly, the career years recorded in our sample range from 3 to 49, with an average 
observation period of 20 years. In our sample of 171 UK academics, 145 (85%) started their 
careers as lecturer or research fellow; 22 researchers (13%) took up a first position in 
industry, and 2 researchers started in senior academic positions. For two researchers, first 
position was not evident from their CVs. The mean starting age is 28.6 with a minimum of 22 
years and a maximum of 38 years.
9
 The mean PhD age is slightly lower at 27.2 years. Among 
the researchers, 45.2% took up their first position immediately after PhD award and 48.8% 
embarked on postdoctoral research; 6% of the researchers in our sample started their work 
careers during or before studying for their PhD degree; 109 researchers (64%) changed jobs 
at least once during their career. In total, we have 159 job changes, with 31 academics 
                                                 
9
 Researchers joining the sample at an older age may have pre-PhD experience in academia or industry; 
however, this is not recorded in our data. 
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changing positions twice during their career, 8 academics changing three times and 1 
researcher moving four times. The mean number of years in one job is 10. 
While we consider only researchers that worked at UK universities in 2005, this includes 
researchers from outside the UK and those with a background in industry. Along their 
careers, 28 researchers changed jobs between industry and academia, and 20 researchers 
moved internationally. 50 researchers (29%) were born and raised outside the UK, primarily 
in Europe (33 researchers). Researchers often move away from their place of birth to take up 
a first permanent post: first permanent position is outside county of birth for 52 researchers, 
including 11 UK-born researchers that take up a permanent position in another country. 
However, the majority of researchers find a position in their country of birth, as indicated by 
the median distance between first permanent job and place of birth (176 miles). 
Between 1982 and 2005, the academics in our sample produced an average 4.45 publications 
per year. Eighty-eight researchers (59%) published their first article during their PhD study or 
a postdoctoral appointment, but before taking up their first tenured employment. The average 
number of publications per researcher per year increased from an average of 4.08 in 1982 to 
5.05 in 2005 with a similar increase in publication quality. Quality is measured as number of 
WoS citations to a publication in the first five years. For quality adjusted publications 
numbers increased from 46 in 1982 to 74 in 2005; this could be due to life-cycle, year or 
mobility effects which this paper attempts to measure. 
3.1 Mobility and reputation 
In the theoretical part of this paper, we stressed the importance of research and reputational 
factors for explaining the academic labor market. Access to resources and an improved 
research environment are incentives to move and are fundamental when analyzing the impact 
of mobility on scientific productivity. In the period analyzed in the paper, wages paid a less 
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important role in the UK academic labor market in particular because of the high level of 
standardization in UK academic salary scales (Deloitte, 2012). We assume that mobility is 
driven by reputation factors and, therefore, identify job changes to either higher or lower 
quality/reputation institutions.  
To measure university prestige we build an original indicator of the university’s disciplinary 
research ranking, based on publication productivity and quality. We use WoS publication 
data on UK Higher Education Institutions (HEI) compiled by Thomson Evidence, for in two 
main subject categories - natural sciences and engineering sciences - for the years 1982 to 
2005.
10
 Our data include information on researchers in chemistry, physics, computer science 
and mechanical engineering. The first two belong to the natural sciences and second two to 
the engineering discipline. We calculate our research ranking indicator as percentile ranks 
(PR) based on the underlying distribution of impact weighted productivity (IWP) of a given 
department per year, normalized linearly. Thus, we measure the contribution of the particular 
HEI to the production of the UK sector relative to the highest contributor.
11
  
This measure of research reputation for a 23-year panel can be constructed only for UK 
universities. Thus, our econometric analysis can only study academic job changes between 
1982 and 2005; it excludes mobility from companies (28 researchers), leaving a sample of 
                                                 
10
 Thomson Evidence cleans UK address information found in WoS (taking account of university mergers) and 
completes missing records. 
11
 See Appendix A for the technical details of the ranking indicator. This is not expected to be significantly 
affected by individual research movements due to the low proportion of changes in the production of mobile 
researchers compared with total university and department production. 
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124 researchers including international mobility, and 108 researchers in the case of within 
UK mobility.
12
  
Researchers in this reduced sample worked at 52 different UK institutions between 1982 and 
2005, and 58 moves between UK universities involved 48 researchers. According to the PR 
indicator, among the 52 UK universities in the sample, 47 are in the top 50% and 17 are in 
the top 10% in the engineering and science disciplines.  
Upward mobility is defined as a move to a department ranked at least 5 percentile points 
higher than the previous department in the year preceding the move (before the focal 
academic joined the new department); downward mobility is defined as a move to a 
department ranked at least 5 percentile points lower than the previous department. In our 
sample, between 1982 and 2005, 21 academics were involved in 22 moves to more 
prestigious institutions, and 19 researchers were involved in 19 moves to less prestigious 
institutions.
13
  
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Figure 1 shows the mean number of publications for the five years prior to and following the 
move. We plot the graph for: the non-mobile sample, for all moves between UK universities, 
for upward mobility, and for downward mobility. We assume a one-year lag between the 
research and its publication. Thus, articles published in the year of the move (year zero) refer 
to research undertaken at the previous institutions. The disruption caused by the mobility 
event will result in the publication pipeline drying up and decreased publication numbers in 
                                                 
12
 We also had to exclude 19 researchers because of incomplete information on the year of promotion. 
13
 We observed 15 lateral moves, i.e. moves between universities of equal or similar ranking. They are not 
analyzed separately here. 
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year 1. Figure 1 confirms the one-year lag between move and publication output. This may 
reflect mobility and adjustment costs which likely result in a decrease in research efficiency 
in year t. However, the number of publications increases from year 2 on. In the case of 
downward mobility, publication rates do not improve, they only return to pre-mobility levels. 
On average, a mobile researcher making a downward move performs worse than a non-
mobile researcher. An upwardly mobile researcher produces a higher number of publications 
even in the years before the move than a downward moving or non-mobile researcher. The 
mean number of publications in the case of an upward move increases further, from year 2 
after the move. Hence, academics moving to higher quality institutions are already 
performing above the average before the move, while academics moving to less prestigious 
universities are those showing below average performance. The difference between the two 
groups increases further in the years following the move. These results are consistent with the 
positive effect of job changes into a better department on productivity found by Allison and 
Long (1990). However, Figure in contrast to their results, Figure 1 shows that the upward 
moving group starts out with higher productivity than the downward moving group.  
3.2 Econometric Specification 
We estimate count data models since numbers of publications and citations are necessarily 
positive values. The data are characterized by over dispersion so we employ pooled negative 
binomial models that take the form:  
 ittiititiititit cXMcXMspE   21exp),,'(
  
(6) 
where sp’it is the count variable representing scientific productivity (sp) as either the 
publication count (Pubit) or the number of citations per publication per year (Citit) of 
researcher i in year t. Mit is the mobility measure, Xit is a set of explanatory variables 
including personal and academic characteristics (pf, pt) and institutional effects (h). ci is an 
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individual time-invariant unobserved effect, including ability and attitude, τt is the time fixed 
effect and υit other time-variant unobserved effects. 
To measure the performance difference between the pre- and the post-mobility periods we 
assume first a lasting career effect of mobility on publication outcomes, and record mobility 
as a one-time shift by defining PostMobit=1 for all the years following the first move (or the 
first upward/downward move). Since the effect of mobility may vary, and different short- and 
long-term effects could be envisaged, we introduce an indicator variable, Mobit, which takes 
the value 1 in the year of the move, and include its lags in the regression. We consider lags of 
three years after job transition to investigate the effect of short-term post-mobility research 
performance. 
The advantage of estimating pooled models is that they relax the strict exogeneity assumption 
of the fixed effects model. However, pooled models do not control for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity (ci). In our case, these unobserved effects might be the individual researcher’s 
specific skills which are positively correlated with the right hand-side variables such as 
mobility, leading to a potential endogeneity problem. In the presence of unobserved 
individual heterogeneity (ci), the estimated coefficient of the mobility variables will be 
upward biased. This problem can be addressed if pre-sample information on the dependent 
variable is available. Specifically, Blundell et al. (1995, 2002) suggest a solution which 
controls for individual heterogeneity (ci) by specifying the academic’s average productivity 
before entering the sample, that is, by using pre-sample information on publications and 
citations. The pre-sample mean of the dependent variable is a consistent estimator of the 
unobserved individual effect (Blundell et al., 1995, 2002) if it mostly corresponds to the 
academic’s intrinsic ability and motivation, both factors that are not directly observable, but 
which may affect scientific productivity. Blundell et al. (2002) use Monte Carlo simulations 
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to show that the estimator remains consistent in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity 
and pre-determined regressors - the case in our estimation. They show also that the efficiency 
of the estimator increases with longer pre-sample observation periods. We measure the 
average number of publications (or citations) published since the start of the PhD and before 
the academic enters the sample (before appointment to her first position or before 1982), 
resulting in pre-sample observation periods of at least 3 and up to 21 years with a mean of 4.6 
years (median of 4 years).  
Theory suggests further that research activity is subject to dynamic feedback (Dasgupta and 
David, 1994), that is, heterogeneous dynamic effects, because each researcher’s performance 
is driven by cumulative unobserved factors (υit), such as learning, family and health, which 
are not controlled for through fixed effects. Blundell et al. (1995, 2002), therefore, argue that 
it is important to consider continuous sample-period dynamics when modeling research 
outcomes. This knowledge stock changes over time and while it increases with experience as 
a by-product of research, it decreases at a rate of δ as the quality of this knowledge decreases 
over time. Thus, to proxy for dynamic feedback within the sample period we calculate the 
depreciated stock of publications (or citations) published during the observation period. We 
assume that knowledge depreciates at a constant rate of 10%
14
 and the sample period 
feedback measure is hence defined as: 
1')1(1''  ititit stockspspstocksp 
    
(7) 
The pre-sample value and the stock variable are included in our baseline estimations resulting 
in a linear feedback model. This dual approach helps to address the problem of endogeneity 
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 Depreciation rates of 15% or 30% return similar results. 
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that arises from correlated individual effects and through feedback from the dependent 
variable.  
Still, the problem of reverse causality of our mobility variables could persist because 
predicted research performance could be related to both, the decision to be mobile and to past 
levels of productivity. Some papers address the endogeneity arising from reverse causality 
between performance and mobility, by employing natural experiments and quasi-randomized 
assignment (Moser et al., 2013; Borjas and Doran, 2012). However, these are rare events and, 
therefore, less relevant when looking for evidence to support current policies. Since mobility 
cannot be randomized, we adopt an instrumental variables (IV) approach (cf. Wooldridge, 
2002a).
15
 Finding plausible instruments is thus difficult, especially in the case of mobility and 
productivity, where one researcher’s instrument might be another researcher’s hypothesized 
cause of publication performance.
16
 We use two instruments to adjust for a researcher’s 
propensity to be mobile: (1) the time invariant distance from place of birth and (2) the time 
variant performance mismatch between the researcher and her department.  
Distance from birth place or home has been found to be an important factor in motivating 
mobility. Dahl and Sorenson (2010) showed for a sample of Danish scientists and engineers 
that the highly skilled also value proximity to family and friends and are willing to forgo a 
part of their incomes to live closer to home. Franzoni et al. (2012) confirm that family ties are 
an important motivation for academics to return to their home country. Researchers living 
                                                 
15
 Another approach to address endogeneity concerns in this setting are matching techniques based on treatment 
effects (cf. Wooldridge, 2002a), but due to the small number of individuals in our sample matching was not an 
adequate technique. 
16
 See Fernandez-Zubieta et al. (2015) for a discussion of alternative instrumental variables to study academic 
mobility.  
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further away from their home town or country are thus hypothesized to be more likely to 
move since such a move will incur lower social costs. We measure distance between birth 
place and location of first permanent academic appointment. Researchers with a history of 
mobility benefit less from social ties developed at a younger age which are considered to be 
the most persistent. Also, experience of pre-job mobility equips the researcher with some 
mobility skills that reduce the cost of subsequent mobility events. The instrument, distance 
from home, is measured as the distance between the first permanent position and the 
researcher’s place of birth.17 The distance is measured in miles using Google Maps. For 
distances of more than 1,000 miles, we calculate flight distance using Air Miles Calculator. 
Due to the skewedness of the variable we use the log of the variable plus 1 to normalize the 
distribution. In our reduced regression sample, for those researchers born in the UK and 
taking up a first position in a UK university, the average distance to place of birth is 152 
miles. When we include researchers from abroad and those that move internationally, the 
average distance increases to 1,105 miles (median is 219 miles).  
The intuition for the performance mismatch instrument is based on the idea that rising star 
scientists might have incentives to leave departments that are in a relative productivity 
decline. A scientist with increasing productivity located in a department that overall is 
experiencing a decrease in performance not only will have high incentives to move out, but 
will also have high opportunities. The instrument is based on department growth in percentile 
rank (GPR), which allows us to distinguish between rising and declining departments in 
terms of productivity. GPR is based on the subject and university specific PR described in 
Appendix A and the relative change in individual research performance, measured as the 
percentage change in quality-weighted productivity (GIP). The instrument varies between 0 
                                                 
17
 For 13 researchers we measured distance from city of high school education.  
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and infinite. For all individual performance changes the instrument is zero if the department 
has increased its PR over the past five years (GPR>0). If the performance of the department 
is increasing the researcher does not have much an incentive to move out. Instead, being in a 
decreasing performance department creates incentives for the mobility of the researcher, 
especially for the ones that manage to improve their research performance.  If both the 
performance of the department and the researcher are decreasing (GPR < 0; GIP<0, 
GPRxGIP>0) then the instrument is equal to the absolute change in GPR. If the performance 
of the department is decreasing (GPR<0) and the focal academic has been able to increase 
her own quality-weighted number of publications during the previous five years (GIP>0, 
GPRxGIP<0), then we add the relative personal increase, to the absolute change of the 
negatively performing department. This is the perfect mismatch case, in which the changes in 
performance are in opposite directions and the propensity of moving out of the department is 
highest and depends on the sum of the changes. The instrument built in this way provides a 
time variant measure for the propensity to be mobile.
18
 For academics at UK universities we 
find a negative department trend for 27% of observations. For half of these declining 
department observations the focal academic increases his or her own performance during the 
same observation period. 
3.3 Variables 
Our primary objective is to measure the effect of job mobility on research productivity. The 
main dependent variables in our specifications are the number of publications in year t 
                                                 
18
 We considered two stricter definitions of performance mismatch (with consequent lost of observations): (a) 
assuming a mismatch only for rising researchers in a declining department and (b) if the researcher declines at a 
slower rate than the department, obtaining similar econometric results. 
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(PUBit) and the total number of citations received by the researcher’s publications in the five 
years after publication (CIT5YRit).  
The main explanatory variables in the regression refer to the mobility event. To measure the 
potential performance difference between pre- and post-mobility periods, we introduce two 
dummies that measure the mobility event: (1) PostMobit,, which switches from zero to 1 in 
the year of first mobility, clearly indicating the pre- and post-mobility periods; and (2) Mobit 
that takes the value 1 only in the year of the move, indicating a one-time shock. Since our 
main focus is on mobility between universities, we run additional models for moves between 
UK universities (PostUNIMobit, UNIMobit) that exclude all researchers with international 
mobility experiences. For both the full and the reduced samples (including and excluding 
international mobility respectively) we run an IV model in which the first equation explains 
job mobility using distance from place of birth (Dis-Birth) and performance mismatch 
(PerfMismatch)  as instruments. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
We argued above that mobility is affected by the reputation of the sending and receiving 
institutions; therefore, we use additional measures for mobility that consider the nature of 
transition: (1) Upward Mobility (PostUPit, UPit) defining a move to a higher ranked 
university, and (2) Downward mobility (PostDOWNit, DOWNit) defining a move to a less 
prestigious university.  
As controls we include academic’s age (AGEit) to account for potential life-cycle effects 
(Levin and Stephan, 1991) and gender (FEMALEi). We control also for a researcher’s 
academic rank. The UK university system has some minimum requirements for consideration 
for promotion. Thus, less senior academics should have a greater incentive to publish, while 
professors, because of their access to research assistance and funding, may achieve high 
  
27 
publication rates. We hence consider three levels of seniority in our analysis: Lecturer or 
Research Fellow before first promotion (RANK1it-1), senior position or rank after first 
promotion (RANK2it-1), and professorship (RANK3it-1). We also include an indicator for 
postdoctoral research experience (POSTDOCi). To account for the researcher’s commercial 
orientation (Crespi et al., 2011) we include patent stock (PATENTit-1) which counts the 
number of patents filed in previous years. To account for any potential department effects 
related to access to resources and networks, we include the university’s rank in t-1 as defined 
in section 3.1 (UniRankingit-1), in the set of regressions that consider only UK institutions. 
We can also expect a ‘London’ effect due to proximity to funding bodies and networks that 
might positively affect research output, and include a London dummy (Londonit-1). We 
include subject dummies to control for discipline effects. A summary of the variables used in 
the regressions and their descriptive statistics is provided in Table 1.  
 
4. Results 
We estimate pooled negative binomial regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the 
individual level and robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Table 2 shows the 
results for all (including international) mobility between universities. Table 3 shows the 
results for mobility between UK universities (excluding internationally mobile academics). 
4.1. Feedback model and IV approach 
To address the problem of endogeneity arising from unobserved effects and reverse causality, 
we use the linear feedback model (Blundell et. al., 2002) by including the pre-sample mean 
and dynamic feedback measure in our models in Table 2 and Table 3 (Columns 1 to 4). Both 
measures are significant and positive in the publication equation, while only the measure for 
dynamic stock is significant in the citations count equation (Column 3 and 4). The 
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implementation of the ‘quasi-fixed’ effect measured by the pre-period mean of the dependent 
variables and their moving stock, which accounts for dynamic effects, allows us to proxy for 
researcher’s ability and avoids confusing ex-ante conditions with ex-post events. The 
feedback model thus reflects the stock of knowledge that is available ex-ante and the effect of 
mobility should therefore be net of these ex-ante effects.  
We also estimate an IV model using distance from place of birth and performance mismatch 
as instruments. We test for endogeneity and the validity of the IV approach, based on the 
two-step model described in Wooldridge (2002b). The residuals-based Smith-Blundell test 
rejects exogeneity of our mobility variable in the publication equation, but not in the citation 
equation. We further use the Hansen’s J statistic to test for the over-identifying restrictions, 
verifying that our instruments are exogenous. The results of the instrumented model are 
presented in Columns 7 and 8.
19
 Both Tables 2 and 3 present the first stage of our IV 
estimation (marginal effects in column 6). We find that our instruments have a positive and 
significant effect on mobility. The results also confirm several of the mobility drivers 
discussed in Section 2. We find: a negative age effect, the older the researcher the lower the 
probability of changing job; women have a lower probability of moving; probability of 
mobility increases with rank, especially from lecturer to senior lecturer; researchers with 
post-doctoral experience are more likely to be mobile; and researchers working in London 
have a higher probability of mobility probably due to the lower mobility costs associated with 
the concentration of universities in London. We found evidence of an important relative 
opportunity advantage with researchers at more prestigious institutions showing a lower 
propensity to move. The time fixed effect shows that mobility propensity increased over time 
up to 1997 and then stabilized. There are some differences between the results in Tables 2 
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 Results of the IV-Model without mobility lags are presented in Appendix B Table B1. 
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and 3. Table 2 shows a lower propensity to move among women, who likely face higher 
mobility costs for international mobility. We also find a negative effect for patent stock, 
which only becomes significant in the case of international mobility.  
The results of the two models, the feedback model and the IV model, show that the effect of 
the post-mobility indicator is the same in sign in both approaches. The coefficients are even 
larger in the case of the IV model and that the feedback model may provide the more 
conservative estimates. The results of the IV model thus also confirm the robustness of the 
results from the feedback model.
20
  
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4.2. Main results 
In Table 2, which shows the results for all (including international) mobility between higher 
education institutions, the number of observations in Column 1 is 1,850 which reduces to 
1,673 in Column 2 due to longer lags that require a minimum of four observation years, i.e. 
consider only academics whose careers began before 2003.  
Column 1 shows publication performance changes after the mobility event. The mobility 
variable is positive, but insignificant, indicating that academics do not perform significantly 
                                                 
20
 If we estimate the non-IV model without controlling for the two feedback variables (naïve model), the 
coefficients of the mobility measures increase and become significant, suggesting that the feedback model is 
able to capture some of the endogeneity inherent in the model (results presented in Appendix B Table B2). This 
confirms the robustness of the approach. 
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better after mobility.
21
 Column 2, which presents the yearly effects of the mobility shock, 
shows some evidence of a short-term negative effect, albeit insignificant. The results are 
similar for citation weighted output (Columns 3-4). 
The results of the instrumented model are presented in Columns 7 and 8. The results show 
that also for the instrumented post-mobility indicator we find no significant effect on 
academic performance in terms of publications. The effect on quality weighted publications 
is positive and significant. 
We can conclude that the results for the general mobility measures give weak support to our 
third hypothesis of an initial negative effect on research performance. We can observe 
negative signs in the first few years following mobility, but these effects remain insignificant. 
We also find no strong support for mobility having a positive impact on scientific 
performance. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
To introduce our ranking measure PR which takes account of the quality of the university 
department we consider only mobility between UK universities (Table 3). We include 
researchers who were born abroad but have moved only within the UK, but exclude all 
researchers that moved internationally as it was not possible to produce a 23-year field-
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 We also analyzed the difference in research performance between mobile and non-mobile researchers to 
investigate whether mobile researchers have a performance premium compared to non-mobile researchers, 
along the whole of their career. The mobility dummy is positive, but insignificant indicating that mobile 
academics do not perform better relative to the group of non-mobile researchers. If we exclude post-mobility 
observations of mobile academics, an estimator that corresponds to a pre-mobility indicator and shows whether 
researchers were more productive before the move, we still find a positive, but insignificant effect. 
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specific ranking that includes non-UK organizations. The number of observations reduces to 
1,579 in Column 1 and 1,424 in Column 2.  
Column 1 shows how publication performance changes after the mobility event. The mobility 
variable is positive, indicating that mobile academics perform better than non-mobile 
academics after mobility, but that the effect is insignificant. In Column 2, which looks at the 
effects of the mobility shock, the post mobility variable remains insignificant. As in Table 2, 
there are indications of a weakly significant negative short-term effect of mobility. The 
results are similar but not significant for citation output (Columns 3 and 4). These findings 
are confirmed in the IV model (Columns 7 and 8). We observe a positive, albeit insignificant 
effect of mobility and a negative short term effect. Overall these results show that mobile 
academics do not outperform non-mobile academics, and provide weak support for our 
hypothesis of an initial negative effect following mobility. 
The coefficients for non-mobility control variables vary slightly across the different mobility 
measures and lags. We report their results from Table 3, in which we control also for 
university ranking. Age is not significantly correlated with publications, but has an inverted 
U-shape effect on the quality adjusted number of publications. Thus, while the number of 
publications does not change significantly over the life-cycle, the quality of publications 
increases for the first few years of the career and then declines from around the age of 40. We 
do not find a significant gender effect, which is in line with Crespi et al. (2011) which uses 
the same sample of researchers. We also do not find an effect of academic rank. Senior 
academic staff are not expected to publish more than researchers in the category RANK 1. 
The patent stock is negative but insignificant in all estimations confirming Crespi et al. 
(2011). 
  
32 
We further find that a postdoctoral appointment, or other temporary research contract 
following the PhD, does not improve future publication numbers or citation counts. Instead, 
we observe a negative effect that is significant for publication numbers in the feedback model 
and for publications and citations in the IV models. This negative effect may be due in part to 
job insecurity and fragmented career path associated with postdoctoral appointments and 
temporary contracts (Stephan, 2012). This negative effect seems to persist also in later career 
stages.  
University ranking has no significant effect on publication numbers. However, we find a 
strong positive sign for the quality adjusted measure. Thus, researchers at the most 
prestigious institutions may not produce more, but may produce publications that are of better 
quality and achieve more visibility than those produced by their peers at lower ranked 
institutions.  
Finally, we find strong differences across disciplines; researchers in chemistry and physics 
publish significantly more, and are more frequently cited, than colleagues in other fields, with 
computer sciences researchers producing the least number of publications and receiving the 
lowest number of citations. 
4.3 Mobility and department quality/reputation 
In Table 4, the mobility effect is conditioned by the nature of the job transition. We only 
implement the feedback model since researchers that do not move upwards or downward 
may still be mobile and the IV model would be misspecified. Also, the above analysis shows 
that the IV model does not provide significantly different results from the feedback model 
and we are therefore confident that the feedback model will provide sufficiently consistent 
estimates. 
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Table 4 Column 1 measures the effect of upward mobility on publication numbers. The effect 
is positive and significant at 85% confidence. A detailed look at the short-term effects 
(Column 2) shows that scientific output decreases in the short term, but that in the long term 
we can expect a non-negative effect indicated by the strong positive coefficient in PostUp.  
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The estimations for citations confirm the short-term negative effect of upward mobility and 
the expectation of a non-negative effect in later years, but the coefficient are not significant. 
The university ranking control variable is positive in Column 3 which considers citation 
outputs for all researchers. This indicates that while not all researchers that are upward 
mobile produce better quality research (as indicated by the insignificant coefficient PostUPit), 
researchers in more prestigious departments produce more visible research. Therefore, 
upward mobile researchers will benefit from this additional prestige effect, potentially 
outperforming previous peers in their old department (as belonging to a higher ranked 
department is associated with more citations). 
Table 4 Columns 5 to 8 report the results for downward mobility (DOWN). They show that 
downward mobile researchers have a lower publication productivity than their non-mobile 
peers, or colleagues who move to higher ranked institutions. This effect persists after 
isolating the short-term effect in Column 6. The negative signs are confirmed for the quality 
adjusted publications measure (Columns 7 and 8).
22
 Interestingly, contrary to the case of 
upward mobility, for downward mobile researchers we find a positive short term effect of 
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 For both upward and downward mobility we consider a different quality weighted variable based on the total 
number of citations received before April 2013 (date of data download) by each year’s papers. Thus, we allow 
for longer (at least 8 years and up to 31 years) time periods of citation accumulation. Results are confirmed with 
stronger significance for the positive impact of upward mobility. 
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mobility in both the publication and the citation equation. The effect is strongly significant 
for citation weighted output, suggesting that academics benefit from a delayed positive effect 
of their publication pipeline that diminishes quickly. Thus, the results for downward mobility 
are generally associated with reduced productivity - possibly due to reduced resources. 
However, for the majority (all but 4) of researchers who moved to a lower ranked university, 
the job change involved a promotion and, thus, potentially more resources. Therefore, the 
negative effect indicates that lower ranked institutions do not offer better packages that 
compensate for loss of institutional prestige and departmental colleagues.  
For department quality, we find an additional positive effect for citations. This indicates that 
researchers moving to a lower quality institution but join a department of acceptable high 
quality may perform better than their counterparts who join a lower quality department.  
Overall, we find no evidence of an overall positive effect of mobility, but the mobility effect 
is conditioned by the nature of the job transition. The econometric analysis provides some 
evidence confirming a positive effect of upward mobility (Hypothesis 1) and some evidence 
of a negative effect of downward mobility (Hypothesis 2). We also found evidence that 
academic job mobility is most often associated with a short-term decrease in research 
performance (Hypothesis 3) especially in the case of upward mobile researchers. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
This article analyzed the impact of mobility on researchers’ productivity. We addressed the 
relationship by developing a theoretical framework based on a job-matching approach for 
academics and the idea of performance driven by capital availability and peer effects. We 
studied job changes and characterized them as upward or downward mobility based on 
department research and reputation ranking.  
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The econometric analysis was based on the careers of a sample of 171 UK academic 
researchers in the period 1982 to 2005. Based on this sample, which should not be biased 
towards mobility, we found a high level of job mobility: two-thirds of researchers changed 
jobs at least once, and one-third was involved in two job moves. In this respect, the UK 
academic labor market resembles the US system more than other European systems.  
First, we analyzed the difference in performance between mobile and non-mobile 
researchers. In both the feedback model and the IV model we found a positive albeit 
insignificant overall effect of mobility, and a negative weakly significant short-term effect. 
Second, based on a unique robust research ranking system for UK university institutions over 
the 23 years period of our panel, we studied performance pre- and post-mobility to a better or 
a worse department than the department of origin. We found that mobility to a higher ranked 
university has only a weakly positive impact on publications output, but not on citations, 
while downward mobility tends to decrease the researcher’s overall research performance. 
We found evidence of decreased productivity in the years after a job change - probably or 
most likely due to adjustment costs. Although upward mobile (though not downward mobile) 
researchers are more productive than their peers, their scientific performance does not 
improve in the short-term after the mobility event. Finally, downward mobile researchers 
may benefit from their preexisting publication pipeline when newly joining a department, but 
their performance drops significantly in later years. Thus, hiring of researchers from top-
departments might be a short-term strategy for lower ranked departments to improve their 
visibility with negative long term productivity pay-offs for the researcher that moves.  
Our results point to a complex interaction between job mobility and productivity, which only 
in certain circumstances might result in a positive impact of the former on the latter. Job 
mobility is far from been always beneficial for individual researchers, instead, for all mobile 
  
36 
researchers job mobility is associated with a short-term decrease in performance due to 
adjustment costs, that does not diminish over the longer term for downward mobile 
researchers. On a side note, we also find some worrying evidence that temporary research 
positions, which have increased in frequency in the last few years (Stephan, 2012), have a 
long-term negative effect on research performance. 
Turning back to the opening question of our article: should I stay or should I go? Our results 
show that a researcher should take into consideration the quality of the home and host 
departments in order to take a job change decision that will be academically productive. If 
she wants to increase her performance, she should not move to a lower quality department 
even if it offers a higher position or better salary. The results can provide some insights into 
academic hiring policies. Departments and universities that choose the strategy of picking 
“stars” from better departments as a strategy for growth compared to other approaches may 
end up paying too much for what they get as the new hire does not manage to keep the 
performance that she had in the previous more endowed institution. From a government 
policy perspective our results might indicate that the incentives for concentration (and 
consequently for mobility) introduced in the UK academic market in the last twenty years 
may not pay back either at the individual level or the system level. Indeed, even mobility to 
better institutions is associated with a very small individual performance premium that might 
not counterbalance the negative spillover on the less reputed department due to the departure 
of the star. Finally, our results indicate that policies encouraging mobility as a mechanism to 
facilitate knowledge creation and dissemination should be fine-tuned by distinguish different 
types of mobility and by considering the individual cost that mobile researchers face. 
Organizations and policy makers could help to diminish the individual costs of mobility by 
offering more support to mobile researchers.  
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There are some caveats to these results due to the small number of observations. Although 
mobility is more frequent in the UK science system it is difficult to build a complete career 
dataset for a large sample of researchers. Due to the complexity involved in collecting full 
career information, and quantity and quality of research output, our sample is small in size 
and may not be representative. However, apart from the requirement for the faculty included 
in the sample to be research active (recipient of at least one EPSRC grant), we do not suspect 
the presence of bias linked to either research performance or mobility.  
Finally, we do not really know much about academic salaries; we made an assumption 
(trying to provide some justification for it) that salary considerations are less relevant in this 
particular labor market. This assumption was probably true in the period of analysis, but 
since then the UK academic market, especially at the professorial level, has changed 
dramatically making our assumption probably less sustainable at least in some academic 
fields.  
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Appendix A: The PR Ranking Indicators 
Following the approach used in Lawson and Soos (2014) we make use of the following two 
indicators to construct the ranking indicator:  
1) raw number of publications for each HEI, each year (P(HEI, year)) and each of the two 
scientific categories;  
2) relative impact (RI) of a university within the discipline, measured as the ratio of its mean 
citation rate to the world average.  
     
   yearTotalPyearTotalC
yearHEIPyearHEIC
yearHEIRI
,/,
,/,
:,    (1) 
We then construct an indicator that measures the Impact Weighted Productivity (IWP) of a 
given department per year, as the basis for our ranking indicator. IWP is the product of the 
two original measures and, thus, considers both department quality and research size within a 
specific subject field:  
 
   
 
   
.
,/,
,
,,
yearTotalPyearTotalC
yearHEIC
yearHEIPyearHEIRIIWP def   (2) 
 
We calculate our research ranking indicator as percentile ranks (PR) based on the underlying 
distribution of IWP. Given the skewed distribution of the IWP indicator, percentile ranking is 
preferred to an ordinal scale which takes no account of ranking differences. We normalize 
IWPs linearly, dividing each value by the maximum value in the year and field. Thus, we 
measure the contribution of the particular HEI to the production of the UK sector relative to 
the highest contributor.  
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 
 
 
 
.
),max(
,
),max(
,
yearHEIC
yearHEIC
yearHEIIWP
yearHEIIWP
PR def   (3) 
 
We consider PR over a three-year period to adjust for possible annual fluctuations, bursts or 
sudden decreases. 
 
Appendix B: Robustness check estimations 
[TABLE B1 HERE] 
[TABLE B2 HERE]
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Figure 1: The average number of publications per academic per year in the five years prior 
and after the move. 
Note: ‘non-immobile’ denotes the sample average for non-immobile academics. The time line does not apply
 9 
Tables 
Table 1: Definition and Summary Statistics of variables used in the regression. 1982-2005 
  Full Sample of HE 
1850 observations 
 Reduced Sample of UK-HEI 
1579 observations 
VARIABLES Definition Mean SD Min Max  Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent Variable           
PUBit Number of publications in t 5.19 6.80 0.0 97  5.52 7.24 0.0 97 
CIT5YRit Number of citations in t to t+5 to publications in t 70.78 108.24 0.0 1122  75.37 113.55 0.0 1122 
Mobility Variable           
PostMOBit Moved at least once between HEI before t 0.33 0.47 0.0 1      
MOBit Moved between HEI in t 0.04 0.20 0.0 1      
PostUNIMOBit Moved at least once between UK HEI before t      0.27 0.44 0.0 1 
UNIMOBit Moved between UK HEI in t      0.03 0.18 0.0 1 
PostUPit Moved upward at least once before t      0.10 0.30 0.0 1 
UPit Moved upward in t      0.01 0.11 0.0 1 
PostDOWNit Moved downward at least once before t      0.12 0.33 0.0 1 
DOWNit Moved downward in t      0.01 0.11 0.0 1 
Feedback measures           
Pre-sample averagei (PUB)  0.70 0.67 0.0 3  0.76 0.66 0.0 3 
Stockit-1 (PUB)  27.65 35.34 0.0 439  29.36 37.49 0.0 439 
Pre-sample averagei (CIT)  9.50 14.39 0.0 75  10.22 14.12 0.0 69 
Stockit-1 (CIT)  358.12 517.91 0.0 5499  376.34 544.55 0.0 5499 
Instrument           
Dis-Birth Log +1 of distance between place of birth and first position 4.99 2.58 0.0 9  5.00 2.31 0.0 9 
PerfMismatch Log +1 of performance mismatch between the researcher and her department 0.l0 0.37 0.0 3.90  0.l1 0.35 0.0 3.66 
Control Variables           
AGEit Age in t 43.46 10.34 25.0 77  43.58 10.46 26.0 77 
FEMALEi Dummy = 1 if female 0.11 0.31 0.0 1  0.10 0.31 0.0 1 
RANK1it-1 Lecturer or Research Fellow in t 0.33 0.47 0.0 1  0.33 0.47 0.0 1 
RANK2it-1 Senior position in t 0.33 0.47 0.0 1  0.35 0.48 0.0 1 
RANK3it-1 Professor in t 0.34 0.47 0.0 1  0.32 0.47 0.0 1 
POSTDOCi Dummy = 1 if postdoc before first position 0.50 0.50 0.0 1  0.53 0.50 0.0 1 
PATENTit-1 Stock of patents up to t-1 0.95 3.11 0.0 25  1.11 3.34 0.0 25 
UNIRANKINGit-1 Ranking of UK HEI in t-1      0.31 0.32 0.0 1 
LONDONit-1 Dummy = 1 if working in London in t-1 0.13 0.33 0.0 1  0.12 0.32 0.0 1 
CHEMISTRYi Chemistry 0.47 0.50 0.0 1  0.51 0.50 0.0 1 
PHYSICSi Physics 0.30 0.46 0.0 1  0.29 0.45 0.0 1 
COMPUTERi Computer Science 0.11 0.32 0.0 1  0.09 0.29 0.0 1 
MECHANICALi Mechanical Engineering 0.12 0.33 0.0 1  0.11 0.31 0.0 1 
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TABLE 2: Effect of overall HE-mobility on publication performance. Feedback model and IV model. 
MODEL Non-instrumented with feedback measures (Blundell et al. 2002) IV 1st stage Coef. Marginal effects IV 2nd stage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
NBREG NBREG NBREG NBREG LOGIT LOGIT  NBREG-IV NBREG-IV 
VARIABLES PUB PUB CIT5YR CIT5YR PostMobit PostMobit PUB CIT5YR 
Pre-sample Average (PUB/CIT) 0.115** 0.120** 0.005* 0.002     
 
(0.054) (0.056) (0.003) (0.003)     
Stock (PUB/CIT) 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.001*** 0.001***     
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)     
Dis_birth     0.109*** 0.018***   
 
    (0.027) (0.004)   
PerfMismatch     0.513*** 0.083***   
 
    (0.175) (0.028)   
PostMobit 0.088 0.073 0.105 0.104   0.336 1.364* 
 
(0.069) (0.069) (0.096) (0.092)   (0.582) (0.699) 
L. Mobit 
 
-0.159  -0.011   -0.137 -0.052 
  
(0.097)  (0.154)   (0.117) (0.174) 
L2. Mobit 
 
0.009  0.050   0.101 0.231 
  
(0.089)  (0.124)   (0.117) (0.210) 
L3. Mobit 
 
-0.094  -0.185   -0.017 -0.132 
  
(0.107)  (0.141)   (0.112) (0.144) 
AGEit 0.039 0.016 0.083* 0.069 0.140** -0.010*** 0.040 -0.007 
 
(0.029) (0.032) (0.045) (0.053) (0.062) (0.002) (0.055) (0.074) 
AGEit 2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001** -0.001 -0.002***  -0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
FEMALEi 0.146 0.004 0.067 -0.122 -0.534** -0.087** 0.326 0.119 
 
(0.135) (0.096) (0.135) (0.134) (0.228) (0.037) (0.295) (0.280) 
Reference: RANK1it-1         
RANK2it-1 0.089 0.078 -0.086 -0.061 1.227*** 0.179*** 0.183 -0.034 
 
(0.076) (0.073) (0.131) (0.130) (0.200) (0.027) (0.209) (0.227) 
RANK3it-1 0.070 0.062 -0.101 -0.083 1.935*** 0.302*** 0.258 -0.205 
 
(0.107) (0.106) (0.163) (0.163) (0.234) (0.032) (0.258) (0.304) 
POSTDOCi -0.133 -0.071 -0.017 0.059 0.421*** 0.068*** -0.345** -0.375** 
 
(0.090) (0.082) (0.110) (0.109) (0.133) (0.021) (0.168) (0.177) 
PATENTit-1 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.063** -0.010** 0.004 0.005 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.027) (0.004) (0.021) (0.022) 
LONDONit-1 -0.112 -0.062 -0.221 -0.211 1.852*** 0.301*** -0.057 -0.511* 
 
(0.117) (0.116) (0.164) (0.160) (0.216) (0.033) (0.226) (0.291) 
Reference: CHEMISTRYi         
PHYSICSi -0.075 -0.083 -0.127 -0.140 -0.432*** -0.070*** -0.338** -0.452** 
 (0.082) (0.077) (0.119) (0.123) (0.147) (0.024) (0.163) (0.207) 
COMPUTERi -0.953*** -0.839*** -1.742*** -1.732*** -0.136 -0.023 -1.614*** -2.858*** 
 (0.154) (0.138) (0.233) (0.235) (0.221) (0.037) (0.202) (0.267) 
MECHANICALi -0.601*** -0.556*** -1.240*** -1.247*** -0.391** -0.064** -1.136*** -2.005*** 
 
(0.172) (0.161) (0.221) (0.210) (0.192) (0.031) (0.218) (0.250) 
Constant 0.642 1.173 2.258** 2.556** -3.411**  0.548 3.524** 
 
(0.670) (0.750) (0.999) (1.208) (1.403)  (1.171) (1.534) 
lnalpha -1.208*** -1.366*** 0.392*** 0.305***   -0.710*** 0.452*** 
log Likelihood  -4436.187 -4062.195 -8847.143 -8113.580 -854.376  -4310.106 -8158.740 
Observations 1850 1673 1850 1673 1747  1652 1652 
Clusters 124 122 124 122   122 122 
Smith-Blundell Test of Exogeneity (p-value)       0.077 0.881 
Hansen’s J statistic (p-value)       0.133 0.466 
Wald-test of  significance of excluded instruments     23.41***    
McFadden's R2     0.240    
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses; Year fixed effects in all models; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 3: Effect of mobility between UK-HEI on publication performance. Feedback model and IV model. 
MODEL Non-instrumented with feedback measures (Blundell et al. 2002) IV 1st stage Coef. Marginal effects IV 2nd stage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
NBREG NBREG NBREG NBREG LOGIT LOGIT  NBREG-IV NBREG-IV 
VARIABLES PUB PUB CIT5YR CIT5YR PostMobit PostMobit PUB CIT5YR 
Pre-sample Average (PUB/CIT) 0.109* 0.117* 0.004 0.002     
 
(0.061) (0.063) (0.003) (0.003)     
Stock (PUB/CIT) 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.001*** 0.001***     
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)     
Dis_birth     0.114*** 0.017***   
 
    (0.035) (0.005)   
PerfMismatch     0.433** 0.065**   
 
    (0.198) (0.030)   
PostMobit 0.114 0.130 0.126 0.133   0.800 1.107 
 
(0.086) (0.087) (0.111) (0.109)   (0.623) (0.772) 
L. Mobit  -0.220*  0.012   -0.285** -0.156 
 
 (0.115)  (0.196)   (0.135) (0.203) 
L2. Mobit  -0.075  -0.012   -0.021 0.020 
 
 (0.093)  (0.138)   (0.139) (0.177) 
L3. Mobit  -0.146  -0.155   -0.109 -0.196 
 
 (0.122)  (0.167)   (0.128) (0.181) 
AGEit 0.036 0.006 0.089* 0.080 -0.013 -0.012*** 0.038 0.024 
 
(0.031) (0.033) (0.047) (0.054) (0.080) (0.002) (0.058) (0.075) 
AGEit 2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001** -0.001* -0.001  -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
FEMALEi 0.192 0.020 0.150 -0.092 0.184 0.028 0.412 0.206 
 
(0.157) (0.113) (0.171) (0.166) (0.228) (0.034) (0.323) (0.309) 
Reference: RANK1it-1         
RANK2it-1 0.106 0.094 -0.036 -0.020 1.620*** 0.208*** 0.121 0.068 
 
(0.084) (0.081) (0.142) (0.143) (0.237) (0.026) (0.238) (0.277) 
RANK3it-1 0.144 0.136 0.002 -0.009 2.043*** 0.278*** 0.295 0.080 
 
(0.130) (0.125) (0.184) (0.187) (0.290) (0.033) (0.276) (0.338) 
POSTDOCi -0.186* -0.108 -0.017 0.092 0.407*** 0.061*** -0.491*** -0.346* 
 
(0.103) (0.092) (0.125) (0.124) (0.153) (0.023) (0.180) (0.202) 
PATENTit-1 -0.003 -0.000 -0.004 -0.004 -0.031 -0.005 0.005 -0.008 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.013) (0.011) (0.024) (0.004) (0.021) (0.023) 
UniRankingit-1 0.053 0.079 0.311** 0.287* -0.725*** -0.109*** 0.155 0.450* 
 
(0.107) (0.113) (0.144) (0.158) (0.242) (0.036) (0.200) (0.254) 
LONDONit-1 -0.074 -0.057 -0.193 -0.225 1.158*** 0.174*** 0.030 -0.167 
 
(0.141) (0.133) (0.199) (0.189) (0.223) (0.033) (0.225) (0.288) 
Reference: CHEMISTRYi         
PHYSICSi -0.063 -0.074 -0.157 -0.173 -0.581*** -0.088*** -0.262 -0.475** 
 (0.088) (0.084) (0.133) (0.139) (0.165) (0.024) (0.176) (0.242) 
COMPUTERi -1.133*** -0.961*** -1.860*** -1.797*** -1.044*** -0.147*** -1.746*** -2.786*** 
 (0.197) (0.179) (0.292) (0.298) (0.272) (0.033) (0.262) (0.381) 
MECHANICALi -0.640*** -0.582*** -1.320*** -1.331*** -0.292 -0.046 -1.153*** -2.090*** 
 
(0.215) (0.202) (0.255) (0.235) (0.231) (0.036) (0.273) (0.292) 
Constant 0.798 1.453* 2.086** 2.235* -0.035  0.502 2.982* 
 
(0.711) (0.768) (1.053) (1.239) (1.776)  (1.299) (1.635) 
lnalpha -1.174*** -1.337*** 0.362*** 0.273***   -0.713*** 0.432*** 
log Likelihood  -3855.741 -3523.254 -7651.487 -6999.140 -680.958  -3726.888 -7041.415 
Observations 1579 1424 1579 1424 1485  1405 1405 
Clusters 108 106 108 106   106 106 
Smith-Blundell Test of Exogeneity (p-value)       0.066 0.174 
Hansen’s J statistic (p-value)       0.165 0.139 
Wald-test of  significance of Instrument     17.55***    
McFadden's R2     0.223    
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses; Year fixed effects in all models; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 4: Effect of upward and downward mobility between UK-HEI on publication performance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  UP UP UP UP DOWN DOWN DOWN DOWN 
VARIABLES PUB PUB CIT5YR CIT5YR PUB PUB CIT5YR CIT5YR 
Pre-sample Average (PUB/CIT) 0.130** 0.135** 0.004* 0.002 0.128** 0.141** 0.005* 0.003 
 
(0.062) (0.064) (0.003) (0.003) (0.057) (0.060) (0.003) (0.003) 
Stock (PUB/CIT) 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
PostUPit    / PostDOWNit 0.213 0.278** 0.011 0.070 -0.173* -0.240** -0.061 -0.215 
 
 (0.135) (0.127) (0.172) (0.161) (0.096) (0.097) (0.144) (0.149) 
L. UPit   / L. DOWNit 
 
-0.384**  -0.067  0.270  0.711** 
 
 
 
(0.174)  (0.314)  (0.189)  (0.332) 
L2. UPit   / L2. DOWNit 
 
-0.246  -0.272  0.116  0.166 
 
 
 
(0.184)  (0.225)  (0.146)  (0.235) 
L3. UPit   / L3. DOWNit 
 
-0.442**  -0.312  -0.057  0.214 
 
 
 
(0.190)  (0.261)  (0.160)  (0.272) 
AGEit 0.036 0.010 0.088* 0.076 0.037 0.013 0.088* 0.088* 
 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.047) (0.053) (0.032) (0.034) (0.047) (0.052) 
AGEit 2 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001** -0.001* -0.001 -0.000 -0.001** -0.001** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
FEMALEi 0.218 0.044 0.151 -0.084 0.187 0.010 0.148 -0.091 
 
(0.155) (0.113) (0.168) (0.164) (0.154) (0.113) (0.166) (0.164) 
Reference: RANK1it-1         
RANK2it-1 0.121 0.094 -0.001 0.008 0.155* 0.127 0.007 0.019 
 
(0.082) (0.079) (0.136) (0.141) (0.086) (0.084) (0.141) (0.145) 
RANK3it-1 0.186 0.157 0.033 0.019 0.210 0.171 0.042 0.022 
 
(0.128) (0.123) (0.182) (0.185) (0.134) (0.128) (0.187) (0.192) 
POSTDOCi -0.190* -0.111 -0.009 0.100 -0.180* -0.099 -0.010 0.103 
 
(0.103) (0.091) (0.127) (0.126) (0.103) (0.090) (0.128) (0.127) 
PATENTit-1 -0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.012) 
UniRankingit-1 0.016 0.047 0.296** 0.275* 0.026 0.046 0.288** 0.270* 
 
(0.097) (0.104) (0.144) (0.159) (0.109) (0.115) (0.147) (0.163) 
LONDONit-1 -0.106 -0.086 -0.166 -0.196 -0.035 -0.031 -0.161 -0.231 
 
(0.138) (0.130) (0.197) (0.186) (0.141) (0.133) (0.193) (0.184) 
Reference: CHEMISTRYi         
PHYSICSi -0.055 -0.063 -0.163 -0.178 -0.087 -0.100 -0.166 -0.193 
 (0.086) (0.081) (0.132) (0.138) (0.089) (0.086) (0.131) (0.138) 
COMPUTERi -1.123*** -0.952*** -1.893*** -1.827*** -1.162*** -1.009*** -1.903*** -1.877*** 
 (0.196) (0.178) (0.286) (0.291) (0.189) (0.172) (0.285) (0.296) 
MECHANICALi -0.632*** -0.580*** -1.297*** -1.316*** -0.651*** -0.604*** -1.295*** -1.325*** 
 
(0.215) (0.198) (0.258) (0.237) (0.222) (0.205) (0.259) (0.234) 
Constant 0.791 1.375* 2.125** 2.326* 0.791 1.301* 2.129** 2.046* 
 
(0.707) (0.734) (1.053) (1.217) (0.734) (0.787) (1.056) (1.200) 
lnalpha -1.181*** -1.355*** 0.364*** 0.274*** -1.178*** -1.342*** 0.363*** 0.271*** 
log Likelihood -3853.608 -3518.873 -7652.747 -6999.892 -3854.932 -3520.293 -7652.574 -6997.226 
Observations 1579 1424 1579 1424 1579 1424 1579 1424 
Clusters 108 106 108 106 108 106 108 106 
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses; Year fixed effects in all models;  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B1: IV regression of performance (excluding lagged mobility variables) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
MODEL NBREG-IV NBREG-IV NBREG-IV NBREG-IV 
 PostMobit PostMobit PostUniMobit PostUniMobit 
VARIABLES PUB CIT5YR PUB CIT5YR 
PostMobit / PostUniMobit 0.237 1.128* 0.632 0.798 
 
(0.567) (0.664) (0.603) (0.753) 
AGEit 0.061 0.006 0.063 0.034 
 
(0.051) (0.067) (0.054) (0.068) 
AGEit 2 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FEMALEi 0.394 0.206 0.477 0.331 
 
(0.305) (0.294) (0.326) (0.322) 
Reference: RANK1it-1     
RANK2it-1 0.221 -0.009 0.161 0.122 
 
(0.205) (0.219) (0.236) (0.266) 
RANK3it-1 0.311 -0.142 0.337 0.170 
 
(0.256) (0.291) (0.278) (0.326) 
POSTDOCi -0.372** -0.359** -0.518*** -0.352* 
 
(0.166) (0.172) (0.177) (0.193) 
PATENTit-1 0.003 0.003 0.004 -0.007 
 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) 
UniRankingit-1   0.113 0.464* 
 
  (0.193) (0.239) 
LONDONit-1 -0.042 -0.415 0.050 -0.058 
 
(0.227) (0.285) (0.224) (0.279) 
Reference: CHEMISTRYi     
PHYSICSi -0.320* -0.447** -0.245 -0.462** 
 (0.165) (0.199) (0.175) (0.232) 
COMPUTERi -1.672*** -2.815*** -1.860*** -2.836*** 
 (0.209) (0.271) (0.269) (0.365) 
MECHANICALi -1.152*** -1.992*** -1.171*** -2.040*** 
 
(0.219) (0.251) (0.273) (0.298) 
Constant 0.132 3.466** 0.058 3.041** 
 
(1.063) (1.365) (1.197) (1.482) 
lnalpha -0.663*** 0.516*** -0.667*** 0.489*** 
log Likelihood  -4584.344 -8713.545 -3959.726 -7511.935 
Observations 1783 1783 1514 1514 
Clusters 122 122 106 106 
Smith-Blundell Test of Exogeneity (p-value) 0.060 0.897 0.035 0.174 
Hansen’s J statistic (p-value) 0.135 0.399 0.165 0.099 
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses; Year fixed effects in all models;  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B2: Effect of Mobility on Performance without controlling for endogeneity (naïve model) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
MODEL NBREG NBREG NBREG NBREG 
VARIABLES PUB PUB CIT5YR CIT5YR 
PostMobit  0.284
** 0.302** 0.324** 0.358** 
 
(0.120) (0.126) (0.154) (0.161) 
L. Mobit  -0.279
***  -0.167 
  (0.102)  (0.154) 
L2. Mobit  -0.065  -0.007 
  (0.097)  (0.150) 
L3. Mobit  -0.169  -0.319
** 
  (0.106)  (0.139) 
AGEit 0.072 0.045 0.064 0.050 
 
(0.046) (0.049) (0.058) (0.064) 
AGEit 2 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FEMALEi 0.393 0.319 0.171 0.049 
 
(0.300) (0.289) (0.274) (0.265) 
Reference: RANK1it-1     
RANK2it-1 0.217
* 0.214* 0.130 0.156 
 
(0.126) (0.126) (0.167) (0.164) 
RANK3it-1 0.324
** 0.328** 0.142 0.169 
 
(0.164) (0.162) (0.219) (0.219) 
POSTDOCi -0.351
** -0.318** -0.257 -0.239 
 
(0.147) (0.147) (0.162) (0.164) 
PATENTit-1 0.002 0.002 -0.009 -0.009 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) 
LONDONit-1 -0.094 -0.059 -0.236 -0.246 
 
(0.211) (0.213) (0.253) (0.253) 
Reference: CHEMISTRYi     
PHYSICSi -0.307
** -0.334** -0.493*** -0.516*** 
 (0.154) (0.154) (0.189) (0.198) 
COMPUTERi -1.638
*** -1.570*** -2.651*** -2.691*** 
 (0.198) (0.193) (0.284) (0.292) 
MECHANICALi -1.167
*** -1.148*** -2.114*** -2.141*** 
 
(0.213) (0.213) (0.241) (0.239) 
Constant -0.013 0.601 2.724** 2.973** 
 
(0.973) (1.071) (1.237) (1.416) 
lnalpha -0.681*** -0.729*** 0.533*** 0.464*** 
log Likelihood  -4697.842 -4342.889 -8979.751 -8249.925 
Observations 1850 1673 1850 1673 
Clusters 124 122 124 122 
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses; Year fixed effects in all models;  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.  
  
